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flip-in right The effect ofpoison pillsecurities on shareholder wealth, Ryngaert, M. (1988). The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth.Journal of Financial Economics,20, 377-417. This paper examines empirical evidence about the effect of poison pill takeover defenses on shareholder wealth. The author shows that announcements of the most restrictive forms of the pill defense are associated with stock price declines. Further research is undertaken and conclusions documented in the text. Poison pillsecurities: Stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure, Malatesta, P. H., & Walkling, R. A. (1988). Poison pill securities: Stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure.Journal of Financial Economics,20, 347-376. This paper tests hypotheses about the wealth effects of poison pill securities and hypotheses about the characteristics of firms that adopt them. The paper shows that firms that adopt poison pill defenses are significantly less profitable than the average firm in their industries during the year prior to adoption. Agents without principles? The spread of thepoison pillthrough the intercorporate network, Davis, G. F. (1991). Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate network.Administrative science quarterly, 583-613. This study compares the agency theory of the firm with interorganizational theory in examining the factors associated with the adoption of the poison pill-a takeover defense issued by a firm's board of directors that can dramatically increase the cost that a hostile buyer would have to pay to acquire the firm-by a panel of Fortune 500 firms between July 1984 and August 1989. Poisonor placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures, Comment, R., & Schwert, G. W. (1995). Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures.Journal of financial economics,39(1), 3-43. This paper provides large-sample evidence that poison pill rights issues, control share laws, and business combination laws have not systematically deterred takeovers and are unlikely to have caused the demise of the 1980s market for corporate control, even though 87% of all exchange-listed firms are now covered by one of these antitakeover measures. On the use ofpoison pillsand defensive payouts by takeover targets, Heron, R. A., & Lie, E. (2006). On the use of poison pills and defensive payouts by takeover targets.The Journal of Business,79(4), 1783-1807. Using a large sample of unsolicited takeover attempts, this paper examines the determinants and effects of targets choice to adopt poison pills either before or after unsolicited offers and to initiate defensive payouts. Do independent directors enhance targetshareholderwealth during tender offers?, Cotter, J. F., Shivdasani, A., & Zenner, M. (1997). Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?.Journal of financial economics,43(2), 195-218. In this paper, the authors examine the role of the target firm's independent outside directors during takeover attempts by tender offer. They find that when the target's board is independent, the initial tender offer premium, the bid premium revision, and the target shareholder gains over the entire tender offer period are higher, and that the presence of a poison pill and takeover resistance lead to greater premiums and shareholder gains. Outside directors and the adoption ofpoison pills, Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills.Journal of financial Economics,35(3), 371-390. This paper shows that the average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. It also shows that the probability that a subsequent control contest is associated with an auction is positively related to the fraction of outsiders on the board. The main aim of this paper is to prove that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders. Takeover defenses of IPO firms, Field, L. C., & Karpoff, J. M. (2002). Takeover defenses of IPO firms.The Journal of Finance,57(5), 1857-1889. This paper analyses the processes, conncept, causes, and the problems associated with IPO firms takeover defense. Takeover defenses and wealth effects on securityholders: The case ofpoison pilladoptions, Datta, S., & Iskandar-Datta, M. (1996). Takeover defenses and wealth effects on securityholders: The case of poison pill adoptions.Journal of Banking & Finance,20(7), 1231-1250. This study examines the valuation effects of any antitakeover amendment on both bondholders and stockholders. It presents new evidence documenting that, on average, there is a significant wealth loss experienced by bondholders at poison pill adoption announcement, while stockholders are unaffected. This finding of significant bondholder losses is consistent with the proposed negative signal hypothesis. Other findings and conclusions are documented. Dopills poisonoperating performance?, Danielson, M. G., & Karpoff, J. M. (2006). Do pills poison operating performance?.Journal of Corporate Finance,12(3), 536-559. This paper documents information contrary to arguments that poison pills degrade firm performance, stating that operating performance modestly improves during the 5-year period after pill adoption. This evidence undermines the widely held view that poison pills have systematically negative effects on firm performance. Corporate governance, Shareholderrights, and Shareholderrights plans:Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?, Caton, G. L., & Goh, J. (2008). Corporate governance, Shareholder rights, and Shareholder rights plans: Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,43(2), 381-400. Framing controversial actions: Regulatory focus, source credibility, and stock market reaction topoison pilladoption, Rhee, E. Y., & Fiss, P. C. (2014). Framing controversial actions: Regulatory focus, source credibility, and stock market reaction to poison pill adoption.Academy of Management Journal,57(6), 1734-1758. In this study, the authors contribute to the research on organizational accounts by examining the role of different framing languages and the credibility of the frame articulator on justifying controversial organizational actions.