Academic Research on Registered Investment Advisor

• Designations Held: CPA/PFSCertified Public Accountant/Personal Financial Planning SpecialistRegistered Investment Advisor Investment Advisor Representative, Business, M. C. (1988). (Doctoral dissertation, University of Texas at Austin). This article presents the bio of Charles Geraci who is a Certified Public Accountant and also a Registered Investment Advisor. He tries to solve various financial challenges that face clients and ensure that their requirements are reflected in the plan. He structures the personal and business finances of clients intending to minimize tax exposure, secure retirement income and also effectively managing risks.
• Who's the fairest of them all? A comparative analysis of financialadvisorcompensation models, Robinson, J. H. (2007). JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL PLANNING-DENVER-,20(5), 56. This paper investigates the economic incentives at work in each of the modes used by investors to pay for financial advice and states that the debate over the best one is flawed since all the models have incentives that can cause conflicts of interest and each one may also provide an optimal choice for particular investor circumstances.
• Protecting investors through hedge fundadvisorregistration: long on costs, short on returns, Atkins, P. S. (2006). Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L.,25, 537. This article discusses mutual funds which have a unique corporate structure. They usually contract the principal management functions to a separate company known as an investment adviser which is paid an advisory fee that is mostly a percentage of the net assets of the fund. The investment advisor has a primary function of portfolio management.
• Finding Bernie Madoff: Detecting fraud by investment managers, Dimmock, S. G., & Gerken, W. C. (2011). The study uses a panel of mandatory SEC disclosure findings to test the predictability of investment fraud. It finds that past regulatory and legal violations, conflicts of interest as well as monitoring are essentially associated with future fraud. The results also suggest that the presently required disclosures have relevant information, but investors do not fully utilize it. 
• The Relationship Between theInvestment Advisorand the Mutual Fund: Too Close for Comfort, Schiffman, H. (1976). Fordham L. Rev.,45, 183. This paper explains that the people who organize mutual funds also act as the investment adviser. It states that although the fund and its adviser are two separate entities where the fund contracts the adviser for various services, it is the adviser that dominates the fund. The conflicts of interest in this relationship are apparent and include blending the duties of corporate directors, independent money managers as well as investment advisers.
• Predicting fraud by investment managers, Dimmock, S. G., & Gerken, W. C. (2012). Journal of Financial Economics,105(1), 153-173. The article investigates the predictability of investment fraud using a panel of mandatory disclosures filed with the SEC. The article finds no evidence that investors receive compensation for fraud risk through superior performance or reduced fees. It also examines the barriers to implementing the fraud prediction models and suggests changes to the SEC's data access policies that could benefit investors.
• Fund advisor compensation in closedend funds, Coles, J. L., Suay, J., & Woodbury, D. (2000). The Journal of Finance,55(3), 1385-1414. This study examines the relationship between the premium on closed-end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisors, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. The results indicate that the fund premium is more significant when the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance and when the assets managed by the advisor are concentrated in the fund in question. 
• Investment intermediaries in economic development, Hagerman, L. A., Clark, G. L., & Hebb, T. (2007). This research explores how large institutional investors invest in affordable housing, mixed-income, and mixed-use real estate and also emerging growth companies under the concept of urban revitalization or economic development. Investment intermediaries link institutional investors to urban revitalization. These intermediaries can take vast amounts of money and channel them into attractive urban investments. 
• Direct not Derivative: Recovering ExcessiveInvestment AdvisorFees in Mutual Funds, Kahn, C. L. (1982). Geo. LJ,71, 1595. This paper states that the special structure of the mutual fund industry separates it from the other investment institutions. In distinction to the ordinary industrial corporation, where the management is internally organized, the usual mutual fund is controlled by an outside entity known as the investment advisor. The advisor creates the fund and manages its operations.
• ADVISOR, PERCENT, Z. (2009). This article explains that according to recent economic data, the worst part of the recession has passed. The stock markets have been steadily rising in anticipation of a recovery, and this indicates that there is likely to be increased economic activity in the next few months. The recession caused an abnormal loss in value across various types of asset classes.
• Confidence mediates how investment knowledge influences investing self-efficacy, Forbes, J., & Kara, S. M. (2010). Journal of economic psychology,31(3), 435-443. This study presents a comprehensive investment literacy questionnaire that surveys potential sources of investing self-efficacy in a significant sample of working adults. The effect of investment knowledge on belief in one's future capacity to develop a plan to achieve investment goals was mediated by confidence. However, the accuracy of the applied investment knowledge of employees was low.